Abstract: In this paper, we propose a network economic model of cybercrime with a focus on financial services, since such organizations are one of the principal targets of such illicit activity. The model is a multiproduct one and constructed as a layered bipartite network with supply price, transaction cost, and demand price functions linking the networks. A novelty of the new model is the incorporation of average time associated with illicit product delivery at the demand markets with the demand price functions being decreasing functions of such times, as noted in reality. The governing equilibrium conditions are formulated as a variational inequality problem with qualitative properties of the solution presented. An algorithm, with nice features for computations, is then applied to two sets of numerical examples in order to illustrate the model and computational procedure as well as the types of interventions that can be investigated from a policy perspective to make it more difficult for cybercriminals to obtain sensitive data.
Introduction
The Internet has revolutionized the way in which individuals and organizations, as well as businesses and governments, communicate, interact, and conduct economic and social activities. According to Internet Live Stats (2014) , it is expected that there will be 3 billion Internet users by the end of 2014 with the first billion reached only in 2005. Coupled with the growth of the Internet as well as the multiple ways of accessing it through mobile devices, for example, there has been a concomitant increase in cybercrime. Cybercrime is "any criminal offense that is committed or facilitated through the use of the communication capabilities of computers and computer systems" (Petee et al. (2010) ). The Center for Strategic and International Studies (2014) reports that the estimated annual cost to the global economy from cybercrime is more than $400 billion with a conservative estimate being $375 billion in losses, more than the national income of most countries.
As noted by Ablon, Libicki, and Golay (2014) , the black market for cybercrime products can be more profitable than the illegal drug trade. Links to end-users or consumers are more direct than in the case of physical goods, and because worldwide distribution is accomplished electronically, the requirements are negligible. A majority of the involved decision-makers, products, and services are online-based and can be instantaneously accessed. The transportation or shipment of pilfered digital goods may only require an email or download, or a username and password to a locked site.
However, not all industries and economic sectors are affected equally by cybercrime. According to the PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2014 Global Economic Crime Survey, 39% of financial sector respondents said they had been victims of cybercrime, compared with only 17% in other industries, with cybercrime now the second most commonly reported economic crime affecting financial services firms. Indeed, Wilson (2013) noted that "every minute, of every hour, of ever day, a major financial institution is under attack." The Ponemon Institute (2013) determined that the average annualized cost of cybercrime for 60 organizations in their study is $11.6 million per year, with a range of $1.3 million to $58 million. In 2012, the average annualized cost was $8.9 million, an increase in cost of 26 percent or $2.6 million from the results of the 2012 cyber cost study. Cyberattacks are intrusive and economically costly.
In addition, they may adversely affect a company's most valuable asset -its reputation.
According to Sarnikar and Johnson (2009) , a secure financial market system is critical to our national economy, with statistics on incident reports collected and disseminated by the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) demonstrating that a disproportionate number of security incidents occur in the financial industry. With financial service firms providing one of the critical infrastructure networks on which our economy and society depends, it is imperative to be able to assess their vulnerabilities to cyberattacks in a rigorous, quantifiable manner as well as to identify possible synergies associated with information sharing. Only by capturing the complexities and the underlying behavior can one then mitigate the risk as well as identify where to invest in order to secure the financial networks on which so many of the financial transactions now depend.
In this paper, we lay the foundation for the development of network economics based models for cybercrime in financial services. We use, as the basis, spatial network economic models, presenting a new multiproduct one, in which we incorporate the critical time component associated with transactions. For example, it is recognized (cf. Leinwand Leger (2014)) that there is a short time window during which the value of a financial product acquired through cybercrime is positive but it decreases during the time window. As reported therein, following the major Target breach, credit cards obtained thus initially sold for $120 each on the black market, but, within weeks, as banks started to cancel the cards, the price dropped to $8 and, seven months after Target learned about the breach, the cards had essentially no value. In addition, different "brands" of credit cards can be viewed as different products since they command different prices on the black market. For example, according to Leinwand Leger (2014) credit cards with the highest credit limits, such as an American Express Platinum card, command the highest prices. A card number with a low limit might sell for $1 or $2, while a high limit card number can sell for $15 or considerably more, as noted above. Hacked credit card numbers of European credit cards can command prices five times higher than U.S. cards (see Peterson (2013) ). For some background on the economics of stolen credentials and the methods used to monetize them, see Shulman (2010) . Moreover, according to Mandiant (2014) , in 2013, the median number of days cyberattackers were present on a victim network before they were discovered was 229 days, pointing to again the critical time element associated with cybercrime and associated costs.
Our view is that financial firms produce/possess products that hackers (criminals) seek to obtain. Both financial services firms as well as hackers are economic agents. We assume that the firms (as well as the hackers) can be located in different regions of a country or in different countries (cf. Perlroth and Gelles (2014) ). Financial service firms may also be interpreted as prey and the hackers as predators. Products that the criminals seek to acquire may include: credit card numbers, email addresses and password information, personal credentials, specific documents, etc. The financial firms are the producers of these products whereas the hackers act as agents and "sell" these products, if they acquire them, at the "going" market prices. There is a "price" at which the hackers acquire the financial product and a price at which they sell the hacked product in the demand markets. The former we refer to as the supply price and the latter is the demand price. In addition, we assume that there is a transaction cost associated between each pair of financial and demand markets for each product. These transaction costs can be generalized costs that also capture risk associated with being "caught." Associated with the product demand price functions is also a time.
By constructing an appropriate computational network economic framework as a foundation, numerous scenarios can then be investigated, as well as policies evaluated. Indeed, Ablon, Liwicki, and Golay (2014) have argued in their study that an economic approach to tackling cybercrime in warranted.
In the financial network cybercrime problem, we seek to determine the supply prices, the demand prices, and the hacked product trade flows satisfying the equilibrium condition that, for each financial product, the demand price is equal to the supply price plus the transaction cost, if there is "trade" between the pair of financial and demand markets; if the demand price is less than the supply price plus the transaction cost, then there will be no (illicit) trade. Indeed, if the cybercriminals do not find demand markets for their acquired financial products (since there are no consumers willing to pay the price) then there is no economic incentive for them to acquire the financial products. To present another criminal network analogue -consider the market for illegal drugs, with the U.S. market being one of the largest, if not the largest one. If there is no demand for the drugs then the suppliers of illegal drugs cannot recover their costs of production and transaction and the flows of drugs will go to zero.
Since the framework that we utilize as the foundation for our modeling, analysis, and, ultimately, policy-making recommendations is that of spatial economics and network equilibrium, we now, for completeness, provide some of the historical background with the supporting literature. Further background can be found in the books by Nagurney (1999 Nagurney ( , 2003 Nagurney ( , 2006 with analogues to financial networks made in the book by Nagurney and Siokos (1997) . Enke (1951) established the connection between spatial price equilibrium problems and electronic circuit networks and showed that this analogue could then be used to compute the spatial prices and commodity flows. Subsequently, the Nobel laureate Samuelson (1952) and Judge (1964, 1971) showed that the prices and commodity flows satisfying the spatial price equilibrium conditions could be determined, under certain symmetry assumptions, by solving an extremal problem, in other words, a mathematical programming problem. This theoretical advance enabled not only the qualitative study of equilibrium patterns, but also opened up the possibility for the development of effective computational procedures. Moreover, it unveiled a wealth of potential applications. Subsequent advances in methodologies, such as variational inequality theory, have allowed for the modeling of price and cost asymmetries as well as multiple commodities (see, e.g., Nagurney (1999) ). Thus far, spatial price equilibrium models have been used to study problems in agriculture, energy markets, and mineral economics, as well as in finance (see, e.g., Judge and Takayama (1973) and Nagurney (1992 Nagurney ( , 1999 , and the references therein) and, more recently, in predator prey ecological networks (cf. Nagurney and Nagurney (2012) ).
The methodology that we utilize for the formulation, analysis, and computations is variational inequality theory. Altough the models that we construct are perfectly competitive ones they are linked to game theoretic formalisms (see, e.g., Dafermos and Nagurney (1987) ) and Nash equilibria. A recent survey of game theory and network security is given by Manshaei et al. (2011) . Our perfectly competitive network economic framework utilizes time concepts from time-based competition in supply chain networks in imperfectly competitive, that is, oligopolistic supply chain markets (see and ). Specifically, as discussed earlier, we have the value of the financial product decrease in time as reflected through the price.
The paper is organized as follow. In Section 2 we present the model, along with its qualitative properties. In Section 3 we outline the computational procedure, along with convergence results, which we then utilize in Section 4 to compute solutions to a spectrum of numerical examples. We summarize our results and present our conclusions in Section 5. 
Source Locations
Demand Markets 
The Multiproduct Network Economic Model of Cybercrime
In this Section, we present the multiproduct network economic model of cybercrime through the use of variational inequality theory, which enables us to capture multiple products and asymmetric properties of the underlying economic functions. The notation for the model is given in Table 1 and the network structure of the model is depicted in Figure 1 . Specifically, the model can be envisioned as o layered bipartite networks, which each network representing a single financial product. The topmost nodes correspond to the source locations for the product and the bottom nodes the demand markets. The underlying functions, which depend on the product flows, link the interactions among the networks. The source locations are computers where the products are located and these can be at the financial service firms, at retailers, in the cloud, at payment processing firms, etc., depending on the specific product, that is, whether credit cards, identity information, bank account numbers, etc.
We first identify the underlying conservation of flow equations. We also discuss the time elements in the model. We, subsequently, present the governing equilibrium conditions, as discussed in the Introduction, and derive the variational inequality formulation. the nonnegative amount of financial product k obtained from source location i and shipped to demand market j; k = 1, . . . , o; i = 1, . . . , m; j = 1, . . . , n. We group the {Q k ij } elements for product k into the vector
+ and all the product shipments into the vector
the nonnegative supply of financial product k at i; k = 1, . . . , o; i = 1, . . . , m. We group the supplies of k into the vector s k ∈ R m + and then group all the supplies of all the products into the vector
the demand for financial product k at demand market j; k = 1, . . . , o; j = 1, . . . , n. We group the demands into the vector d k ∈ R n + and then all the product demands into the vector
the time between the acquisition of product k from source location i and its sale at j where k = 1, . . . , o; i = 1, . . . , m; j = 1, . . . , n. T k ave,j the average time for delivery of product k at demand market j, where
, where k = 1, . . . , o; j = 1, . . . , n. We group the average times for product k into the vector T k ∈ R mn + and then group all these vectors for all the products into the vector
the price of acquiring product k at source location i; k = 1, . . . , o; i = 1, . . . , m. We group these supply prices for product k into the vector π k ∈ R m + and then group these vectors into the vector π ∈ R om + . ρ k j (d, T ave ) the demand price of financial product k at demand market j; k = 1, . . . , o; j = 1, . . . , n. We group the demand prices for product k into the vector ρ k ∈ R n + and then all such vectors into the vector
the unit transaction cost associated with transacting product k between i and j; k = 1, . . . , o; i = 1, . . . , m; j = 1, . . . , n. We group the transaction costs for k into the vector c k ∈ R mn + and then group these vectors for all products into the vector c ∈ R omn + .
The conservation of flow equations are:
According to (1), for each financial product, the supply (amount pilfered) at a location is equal to the sum of the flows of the product to all the demand markets. Similarly, according to (2), the (illicit) demand for a financial product at each demand market is equal to the sum of the flows of that product from all source locations to the demand market. Finally, (3) formalizes that the financial product flows are nonnegative.
In addition, we introduce the following expression, which captures time:
where the h k ij terms are positive and the t k ij terms are nonnegative. The time expressions in (4) capture the delay associated with the cybercrime activity and the sale of the product on the black market. This time also, in a sense, can reflect the time associated with the financial service firms learning about the breach. As noted in the Introduction, the value or price of the financial product depends not only on the quantity on the black market but also the time. Indeed according to Brian Krebs (cf. Leinwand Leger (2014) ) "The most important part of the price is the freshness, before the victim knows they've been breached and when no one is canceling." "The guarantees on the cards dwindle the older they get." Hence, certain financial products that are targets of cybercriminals actually have a perishability characteristic which can be viewed as a deterioration in quality in the context of supply chain networks (cf. ).
As can be seen from Table 1 , the demand price functions depend on the vector of financial products and also on the vector (in general) of the average delivery times of the pilfered financial products at the demand markets. Average time concepts have been used in the context of supply chain networks with demand price functions being decreasing functions of average times (cf. ). In view of (4) and (3), we can define new demand price functionsρ k j , ∀k, ∀j (cf. Table 1) as follows:
If the demand at a demand market for a product is equal to zero, we remove that demand market from the network for that product since the corresponding time average would not be defined.
Also, in view of (1) we can define new supply price functionsπ k i , ∀k, ∀i (cf. Table 1) as:
which allow us to construct a variational inequality formulation governing the equilibrium conditions below with nice features for computations. We assume that all the functions in the model are continuous.
The Network Economic Equilibrium Conditions
The network economic equilibrium conditions for cybercrime have been achieved if for all products k; k = 1, . . . , o, and for all pairs of markets (i, j); i = 1, . . . , m; j = 1, . . . , n, the following conditions hold:
where recall thatπ The equilibrium conditions (7) reflect that cybercriminals will have no incentive to acquire a financial product at a location if the price associated with acquiring it plus the unit transaction cost exceeds the price that they are able to get for the product at the demand (black) market. They will acquire the product at a source location and will trade it if the demand price for the product at the demand market is equal to the acquiring (or supply) price plus the unit transaction cost. These are the well-known spatial price equilibrium conditions (cf. Samuelson (1952) , Takayama and Judge (1971) , Florian and Los (1982) , Dafermos and Nagurney (1984) , Thore (1991) , Nagurney (1999) and the references therein) adapted to the illicit cybercrime application but with the novelty of embedded times in the demand price functions.
We define the feasible set K ≡ {Q|Q ∈ R omn + }.
Theorem 1: Variatinal Inequality Formulation
A product flow pattern Q * ∈ K is a cybercrime network economic equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality problem:
Proof: We first establish necessity, that is, if Q * ∈ K satisfies the network economic equilibrium conditions for cybercrime given by (7) then it also satisfies variational inequality (8).
From (7), we have that, for a fixed k and (i, j) pair:
. Indeed, if Q k ij * > 0, then, according to (7), the term before the multiplication sign in (9) is equal to zero, so the inequality holds true and, if Q k ij * = 0, then both terms on the left-hand side of the ≥ 0 expression in (9) are nonnegative so their product is also nonnegative.
But (9) holds for each product k and every pair (i, j); hence, summation of (9) over all k, i, j yields:
which is precisely variational inequality (8) We now establish sufficiency, that is, a solution to variational inequality (8) also satisfies the economic equilibrium conditions (7).
Into (8), we make the following substitution. We set:
From (11) 
which is the first part of the cybercrime network economic equilibrium conditions (7).
On the other hand, if Q l pq * = 0, then we know that
since Q l pq ≥ 0 by assumption of nonnegative product flows, and (13) is simply the second part of the economic equilibrium conditions (7).
The above arguments hold for any financial product and pair of markets; hence, we have established sufficiency. 2
We now put variational inequality problem (8) into standard form (see Nagurney (1999) ): determine X * ∈ K, such that
Specifically, we define K ≡ K, X ≡ Q, and F (X) ≡ (F kij (X)); k = 1, . . . , o; i = 1, . . . , m; j = 1, . . . , n, where
In order to compute solutions to the above described financial service firm network economic cybersecurity models, one can avail oneself of numerous algorithms that exploit the special network structure. For details, see Aronson (1988, 1989) , Nagurney and Kim (1989) , Nagurney (1987 Nagurney ( , 1989 Nagurney ( , 1999 Nagurney ( , 2006 and the references therein. Before proposing an algorithm that we will use to compute solutions to the numerical examples, we first provide some qualitative properties of the equilibrium pattern.
Qualitative Properties
Since the feasible set K in our model is not compact, that is. closed and bounded, existence of a solution is not guaranteed unless other conditions are satisfied from the standard theory of variationa inequalities (see Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia (1980) and Nagurney (1999) ).
We could, of course, assume that both the demands and the supplies of the financial products are finite (although they may be very large), and, hence, the product flows will also be bounded. If this is the case then a solution to variational inequality (8) is guaranteed since the function F (X) that enters the equivalent variational inequality (14) is continuous under the assumptions made earlier that the underlying functions (supply price, demand price, and unit transaction costs) are continuous. It would then follow that there would be a unique solution to (14) (and (8)) if the function F (X) in our model was strictly monotone, that is:
Under the slightly stronger condition of strong monotonicity, that is, if
we are guaranteed both existence and uniqueness of a solution X * to (14).
Moreover, we know (cf. Nagurney (1999) ) that if ∇F (X) is positive-definite over K then F (X) is strongly monotone.
The Algorithm
For the solution of the numerical examples in the next section, we apply the Euler method, which is an algorithm induced by the general itartve scheme of Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) . It general statement is as follows.
The Euler Method
At each iteration τ one solves the following problem:
where P K is the projection operator.
As shown in Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) and Nagurney and Zhang (1996) , for convergence of the general iterative scheme, which induces the Euler method, among other methods, the sequence {a τ } must satisfy:
Specific conditions for convergence of this scheme can be found for a variety of network-based problems, similar to those constructed in Nagurney and Zhang (1996) and the references therein; see also , Toyasaki, Daniele, and Wakolbinger (2014) , and Saberi, Nagurney, and Wolf (2014) .
The realization of (17) takes on the following explicit formulae for our model.
Explicit Formulae for (17)
In particular, we have the following closed form expression for the product flows k = 1, . . . , m; i = 1, . . . , m; j = 1, . . . , n:
Theorem 2: Convergence
In the cybercrime network economic model, assume that F (X)) is strongly monotone and uniformly Lipschitz continuous. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium product flow pattern Q * ∈ K and any sequence generated by the Euler method as given by (17), where
Proof of the above Theorem follows from Theorem 6.10 in Nagurney and Zhang (1996) .
Numerical Examples
The Euler method was implemented in FORTRAN and run on a Linux system at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. The algorithm was initialized with all financial product flows equal to 1.0. The convergence criterion was set to 10 −4 , that is, the Euler method was deemed to have converged if the absolute value of each of the successive product flows was less than or equal to .
We solved two sets of examples, each with three examples. Below we describe the examples and the results obtained.
Example Set 1: 2 Financial Products, 2 Supply Markets, and 1 Demand Market
In this set of examples, we computed solutions to problems consisting of 2 financial products, with product 1 being a higher-valued credit card, and product 2 a lower-valued credit card. There are 2 locations at which these cards are stored, on computer servers, and a single illicit demand market for each of the financial products. The network topology for the first set of examples is depicted in Figure 2 . The input data for each example are given below. The computed equilibrium financial product flow patterns for the first set of examples are reported in Table 2 . The incurred equilibrium supply prices, unit transaction costs, demand prices, and average times, in turn, are reported in Table 3 .
Example 1
The data for Example 1 are below. The supply price functions are: .
The Euler method converged to the solution reported in Tables 2 and 3 in 540 iterations.
Example 2
Example 2 was constructed from Example 1, except for the following changes. The fixed terms in the link time functions were increased so that they are now: This kind of change could reflect that it is becoming more difficult for the cybercriminals to fence the pilfered credit card information. As a consequence, the prices drop for both financial products at the demand market, and the average time for delivery increases substantially. The Euler method required 539 iterations for convergence.
Example 3
Example 3, in turn, was constructed from Example 2 with the data identical to that in Example 2 except for new supply price functions, which are now: In particular, the fixed term components were increased substantially to investigate the impact, from a policy or investment perspective, of making it more difficult to attack the computer servers and have the financial information extracted from them. There is now a slight decrease in the average times, as compared to the results for Example 2 and a significant increase in the demand market prices for the two products.
The Euler method converged in 494 iterations. As can be seen from Table 2 , as more stringent policies are put into place, by making it harder to transact (Example 2), and then also harder to obtain the sensitive credit card data (Example 3), the equilibrium financial flows decrease. This happens for each of the credit card types. Hence, the cybercriminals have acquired fewer financial products. The computed equilibrium financial product flow patterns for the second set of examples are reported in Table 4 . The incurred equilibrium supply prices, unit transaction costs, demand prices, and average times, in turn, are reported in Table 5 . Table 4 one can see that product 1 from supply location 1 and product 2 from supply location 2 is not acquired and sold at demand market 2 since the corresponding equilibrium flows Q 1 12 * and Q 2 22 * =0.00. 962 iterations were required for convergence to the imposed tolerance level.
Example 5
Example 5 has the same data as Example 4 except that now we have a modification in the demand price function associated with the second product at demand market 2 so that:
Such a change might represent that the value of this financial product has increased at that demand market. The price for the second financial product at the second demand market has now increased and Q 2 22 * is now positive. Full output results are given in Tables 4 and 5. The Euler method converged in 1,402 iterations.
Example 6
Example 6 was constructed from Example 5 and had the same data except that we increased the fixed terms in all the transaction cost functions so that: The above numerical examples, although stylized, provide important managerial insights that cybersecurity professionals may take advantage of in securing their data. In particular, the examples show the quantified impacts of changes in the data (the supply price, demand price, and transaction cost functions) on the equilibrium financial product flows, and on the incurred demand prices and average times for product delivery. Moreover, the results are consistent with existing data on hacked credit cards. For example, Goncharov (2012) reports that the cost, that is, the supply price, of hacking into various accounts can range anywhere from $16 to over $325. Also, as reported in Ablon, Libicki, and Golay (2014) , following an initial breach, the markets may get flooded with cybercrime products leading to a decrease in prices, which the structure of our demand price functions capture. Credit cards acquired in the Target breach initially fetched from $20 to $135 depending on the type of card, expiration date as well as limit (cf. Ablon, Libicki, and Golay (2014) ). Hacked European credit cards, as noted in the Introduction, can command prices five times higher than hacked U.S. based ones. Although our numerical study did not focus on a specific historical data breach, the results are not inconsistent with results obtained in practice. Finally, the model captures the crucial time element in the demand market pricing of products obtained through cybercrime with a focus on financial services. 
Summary and Conclusions
Cybercriminal activity is posing great threats to the loss of financial and other information and presenting companies and organizations with major challenges. Financial service firms, and their products, in particular, from credit card data to personal information, are major targets and such firms have encumbered significant losses. This world scenario merits a closer look at addressing the behavior of cybercriminals in order to ascertain possible interventions and preventive measures. This is a global problem, with attackers coming from numerous geographic locations, including Eastern Europe and China.
There has been pressure to include economics into models of cybercrime and cybersecurity and, to the best of our knowledge, the multiproduct model presented in this paper is the first network economic model of cybercrime. The foundations are derived from spatial economics and spatial price equilibrium in order to provide the appropriate framework. Such models have had wide reach and application in economics, regional science, and operations research, but have not, until now, been utilized to formulate cybercrime activity. A novel extension of multiproduct spatial price equilibrium models, which we propose, is the inclusion of an average time element since it has been noted in practice that the value of pilfered financial products obtained through cybercrime decay over time, as the recent mega Target data breach vividly illustrated.
We utilize variational inequality theory to formulate, analyze, and solve the model. We provide illustrative numerical examples in which we also explore potential policy interventions by:
1. making it harder to attack the locations with the financial products (that is, computer servers) through increases in the supply price functions; 2. making it more difficult for cybercriminals to transact through increases in the transaction cost functions, as well as 3. evaluating alterations in the demand price functions to evaluate the impacts of greater (or less) interest in such products at the demand markets.
Our framework is computationally tractable and enables the investigation of multiple sensitivity analysis scenarios. The numerical examples support intuition but also provide quantifiable results. Furthermore, given data availability, the model can be appropriately fitted.
This framework, we believe, is just the beginning and extensions are clearly possible, which we leave for future research -from the inclusion of multiple time periods to the incorporation of stochastic components, as examples, plus empirical analysis. The model is sufficiently general, yet, at the same time, the algorithm is easy to implement, so we can foresee further applications of our framework in the future.
